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MASS AND REPETITIVE LITIGATION
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
EDW ARD H. COOPER*
1. INTRODUCTION
The topic of "Mass and Repetitive Litigation in the Federal
Courts" is even more vast and unwieldy than the complex litiga-
tions it brings to mind. The implicit assignment to address the
topic by contemplating the events that may occur over the next
century is still more daunting. One hundred years will bring un-
tellable changes to all of our social and political institutions, ju-
dicial and otherwise. Rather than attempt to meet the challenge
by uttering bold prophecies of the circumstances that will con-
front our successors of the future, I will follow an easier course.
This paper will select a few illustrations of mass and repetitive
litigation and address them from the perspectives generated by
smaller, more familiar, but nonetheless difficult problems of sim-
ple litigation.
If there is a conclusion, it can be stated as well at the outset
as at the end. A century from now we will not have fully satis-
factory means of resolving ordinary litigation, whether through
tribunals similar to the present court system or through quite
different institutions. The answers we will have reached for han-
dling ordinary litigation will remain conditional and tentative,
even as our procedure today is conditional and tentative. The
practice we will have adopted for handling mass litigation will be
even more clearly unsatisfactory and even more avowedly in a
process of transition toward still different practice. We will have
to keep trying and will do fairly well. If this conclusion seems
the counsel of despair and pessimism, it should not. To the con-
trary, it is intended as an expression of faith and optimism.
The first step along the way in this adventure will require
reflection on the interdependence between substantive and pro-
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Michigan
Law School. A.B., 1961, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1964, Harvard Law School.
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cedural law, including the interdependence between the overall
character of our procedural system and our ability to reduce re-
petitive litigation. Then it will be asked whether federal courts
can make distinctive contributions in managing the problems
that arise from mass and repetitive litigation. The next two
steps are closely related. The reasons that traditionally lead to
fragmentation of related litigation into separate suits remain the
standard against which all departures must be measured. The
forces that drive in the opposite direction, pushing toward uni-
tary consideration and decision, likewise must be examined.
With this background, it is possible to explore a variety of
means that might be used to reduce repetitive litigation. Despite
the proliferation of devices that can be expanded from present
practice or created afresh, there are really only two underlying
strategies. The first is to coerce joint participation in unified
proceedings. The second is to use the disposition of one proceed-
ing to control the outcome of independent proceedings on some
theory of representation that permits the acts of actual partici-
pants to bind nonparticipants. As will be seen, the seeming dif-
ferences between these strategies may not be as great as they
first appear. Whatever blend of these strategies is chosen and
however they are elaborated into specific procedural devices, it
seems likely that substantial sacrifices will be made in the quest
for means to manage mass litigation and to reduce repetitive
litigation.
One last preliminary observation may prove helpful. "Mass
and Repetitive Litigation" provides a loose label that can em-
brace many different phenomena. At one end of the spectrum
might be a single automobile accident that injures two people.
Thinking about the rules of joinder and preclusion that should
apply to this situation helps in thinking about the rules to apply
in mass litigation, but it seems fair to assert that the potential
suits present in this setting do not involve mass litigation and
threaten repetitive litigation only at the bare threshold. The
lawsuits that might arise out of the crash of a fully loaded pas-
senger plane obviously qualify, but present problems very differ-
ent from the problems growing out of decades of using asbestos,
causing injuries and creating risks that have not yet played out.
Quite different problems are presented by a price fixing conspir-
acy that injures many consumers, whether in small amounts over
a brief period or in more significant amounts. Still different
[Vol. 38
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problems are presented by litigation to eliminate segregation
from a local school system, to reform a state prison system, to
preserve important resources of the environment, or to strike
down social security regulations affecting the benefits of mil-
lions. In the brief scope of this paper it will be possible only to
touch on some of the myriad problems that these settings
present.
II. THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN PROCEDURE AND
SUBSTANCE AND BETWEEN PROCEDURE AND PRECLUSION
A. The Interdependence Between Procedure and Substance
Whether dealing with mass litigation or the simplest of
problems, neither procedure nor substance can be developed
without considering the other.
Development of substantive rules must be shaped by the ca-
pacities of the agencies that will administer the rules. Considera-
tion must be given both to the ability to implement a rule accu-
rately in individual cases at acceptable cost and also to the
ability to administer the rule in a setting that includes other liti-
gation involving that rule or other rules. The decision whether to
permit compensation for pain and suffering arising from a per-
sonal injury, for example, must take account of the ability of
courts or other tribunals to generate meaningful evaluations of
pain and suffering. Even if we are satisfied that reasonable eval-
uations can be made in individual cases, we should ask whether
awards will be made to a sufficient number of those who suffer
such injury to justify the enterprise.
Development of procedural rules may be shaped by substan-
tive rules in a variety of ways. We may, for example, entertain
serious doubts about the intrinsic propriety of allowing compen-
sation for pain and suffering. Such doubts may be translated
into procedural rules forbidding per diem pain and suffering ar-
guments to the jury as a means of curtailing the actual operative
effect of the compensation rule. In more general terms, we may
tailor seemingly universal rules of procedure to the perceived
needs of different categories of cases. Although it remains a mat-
ter of considerable dispute, an illustration is provided by the
fact that in many courts the requirements of notice pleading are
19871
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quite different for antitrust claims than for negligence claims.1
This interdependent process of adjusting substance and
procedure to each other will be one of the central features in
accommodating the perceived needs of mass litigation. At times,
the predominant adjustments will be made in the area of proce-
dure. At other times the predominant adjustments will be made
in the area of substance, often because of the conclusion that our
system of adversary litigation simply is not capable of justly ad-
ministering the substantive rules we now know. Since most of
the ensuing discussion will focus on matters of procedure, it may
be helpful to pause for a moment to offer the most obvious ex-
ample of possible substantive adjustment.
The topic of mass litigation increasingly conjures up images
of mass torts affecting dozens of victims caught up in a bus acci-
dent or literally millions of victims caught up in the use of a
widely distributed product. It is now commonplace to wonder
how long we will continue to adhere to court-administered reme-
dies based on some concept of fault or defect. The sources of
concern are in part intrinsic to the substantive enterprise of con-
temporary tort law, and in part interdependent with the realities
of contemporary administration of tort law. At the level of in-
trinsic doubt, a single illustration suggests questions that have
no conclusive answer. Imagine two fabulously successful rock
music stars and two workers engaged in routine custodial work.
One rock star and one custodian are injured simultaneously in
exactly the same way by a single car as they stand at a street
corner. At the same time, the other rock star and custodian suf-
fer cerebro-vascular accidents that inflict upon them the same
disabilities suffered by the automobile victims. The diversion of
our collective social assets to care for and compensate these four
different persons will be quite different if we assume ideal im-
plementation of the remedies now theoretically available. The
question whether this is the best outcome in its own terms
seems open to fair debate.
However satisfied we may be with the abstract rules of tort
compensation and noncompensation, if perfectly administered,
1. For detailed review of the variety of actual pleading practices, tailored to per-
ceived differences in the needs of different substantive areas, see Marcus, The Revival of
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLu. L. REv. 433
(1986).
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those rules also are subject to question on the score of our proce-
dural capacity to administer them. The doubts arise on many
fronts. One doubt, perhaps the least troubling, goes to our abil-
ity to achieve fair administration of the rules in the routine dis-
position of each individual case; we accept and may praise our
administration in relatively simple cases and simultaneously
doubt our administration when judge or jury is called upon to
resolve complex issues of fair scientific debate. Even at this
level, however, the transaction costs of adversary litiga-
tion-with or without commercial insurance-are a source of
deep discomfort, discomfort that cannot be dispelled merely by
tinkering with the rules allocating the burden of counsel fees be-
tween the parties. At a similar level of procedure in the small,
we should be equally troubled about our ability to achieve like
treatment of like cases that go to trial. Examining the system as
a whole, moreover, our ability to achieve like treatment of like
cases seems yet more uncertain. Most people with claims never
file suit; most suits that are filed never proceed to official dispo-
sition, by trial or otherwise; the system would collapse immedi-
ately if this were not so. The possibility that by these means we
are achieving a like relationship between injury and redress for
all tort victims is vanishingly small.
In conjunction with these doubts, concern also must be di-
rected to the allocation of scarce judicial resources. Unless we
can expand court capacity indefinitely-a proposition that few
would champion-we must decide which problems have the
highest call on the courts in terms of the intrinsic importance of
the problems and of the relative capacity of courts to resolve the
problems. Late twentieth-century tort litigation may not fare
well in a dispassionate allocation of judicial resources.
Little valor is required to predict that one hundred years
hence these problems will have been addressed by profound
changes in the underlying rules of compensation for personal in-
jury and in the system of administering compensation. Nonethe-
less, for years to come, courts will continue to struggle with
these problems. Much of the discussion of mass and repetitive
litigation must accordingly be devoted to them.
B. The Interdependence Between Procedure and Preclusion
The interdependence between procedure and preclusion de-
1987]
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serves brief exploration in each of two directions. First, rules of
procedure and preclusion can be developed together to reinforce
or qualify each other. Second, the extent to which rules of pre-
clusion can be expanded to foreclose ever more possibilities of
repetitive litigation depends upon our judgment as to the overall-
quality of our procedural system.
The interdependence between the details of procedure and
the details of preclusion can be illustrated easily. Rule 13(g)2
permits but does not require cross-claims between coparties
when the claims arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the original action or a counterclaim. Exer-
cise of party discretion established by this rule is strongly influ-
enced by the choice between different possible rules of coparty
preclusion. A rule that permits coparties to relitigate any issue
decided in the original action as long as they did not become
formal adversaries by the assertion of a claim between them
maximizes the freedom of choice whether to cross-claim. A rule
that permits relitigation only if the coparties were not in fact
adversaries to an issue in the actual presentation of the case
reduces the scope of freedom. A rule that permits nonmutual
preclusion between coparties without regard to either of these
limits exerts substantial pressure to cross-claim. When the judg-
ment will be available to foreclose relitigation of an issue, the
issue is at risk and assertion of the coparty's claim may be the
only way to present it in a strategic posture that even comes
close to the advantages of independent litigation and
determination.3
Another illustration comes even closer to the heart of mass
and repetitive litigation. The availability of nonmutual issue
preclusion influences party joinder in many ways. A plaintiff
who knows that a second potential defendant will be able to as-
sert nonmutual defensive preclusion has a substantial incentive
to join that defendant in the first action. The incentive is not
the same as a rule requiring joinder; if the plaintiff believes that
the strategic disadvantage of joinder is great, he remains free to
sue one defendant alone and hazard the risks of nonmutual pre-
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
3. The various possible rules of coparty preclusion and their consequences are de-
scribed in 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE Ju-
RISDIcTroN 2D § 4450 (1981) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
[Vol. 38
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clusion. A plaintiff who hopes to make nonmutual offensive use
of a judgment won by another plaintiff, knowing that he will not
be bound if the other loses, has every incentive to avoid joinder
in the first suit. This problem is so obvious that nonmutual of-
fensive preclusion commonly is denied if the second plaintiff
could easily have joined the first action. This accommodation of
joinder and preclusion rules awaits further development, as
courts will need to determine how far strategic disadvantage
should be counted in determining whether it was "easy" to join
the first action. The accommodation, however, is plain.4
Adjustment of preclusion rules to the perceived capacities of
our procedural system is a more elusive matter. At the most fun-
damental level, the choice is clear. The results produced by our
process of adversary litigation are not completely reliable.
Learned Hand long ago observed that as a party he would fear
litigation more than anything short of illness and death.5 A more
poetic expression of the same sentiment is found in the ancient
curse wishing that your enemy be party to litigation in which he
knows he is right. Yet the very purpose of our process is to re-
solve disputes and to achieve repose. The core of res judicata lies
in doctrines that are not even expressed in the traditional lan-
guage of res judicata, but in the deeper principles of finality that
limit severely the opportunities to reopen a final judgment.
Wrong it may be, but final it remains.
Once the question moves beyond the finality of the first
judgment, choices become less clear. At one end of the spectrum,
we do not apply the force of res judicata to rulings on "pure"
questions of law divorced from any specific fact application. In-
stead, we rely on more fluid concepts of stare decisis, recognizing
that even apart from the frailties of our fact finding process, ju-
dicial pronouncements on the law should be open to reexamina-
tion. Applications of law to closed historic fact, on the other
hand, confront us with conflicting desires for finality and accu-
rate decision. Even as to continuing controversies, we may be
tempted to rely on preclusion when there is no discernible
4. See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4465, at 596-98.
5. See L. Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in
ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926)
("[A]s a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness
and death.").
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change in the underlying facts or legal principles.
The difficulty of the choices between finality and fallibility
underlies much of the ongoing effort to develop principles to
manage mass and repetitive litigation. More detailed examina-
tion of these choices is accordingly postponed to later sections.
III. Is THERE A DISTINCTIVE ROLE FOR FEDERAL COURTS IN
MASS LITIGATION?
The federal courts established pursuant to article III of the
Constitution6 are a precious and limited resource. Without de-
tracting from the quality and accomplishments of state courts, it
is commonly recognized that judicial business should be allo-
cated between state and federal courts in a way that provides
maximum benefit from the federal courts. Augmented demands
on the federal courts, however, cannot be met simply by contin-
ual expansion. Expansion is limited by several constraints. At
the district court level, the mix of litigation may be sufficiently
different from the mix in state courts to require judges who dif-
fer in some respects from state judges, and of a type difficult to
attract to the bench. However that may be, mindless expansion
runs the risk of bureaucratization and routinization, creating in-
stitutions better fit for processing large volumes of mundane dis-
putes than for expertly deciding more complex disputes. Even if
district courts could be expanded without limit, regional courts
of appeals cannot. Our present circuit structure does not ensure
national uniformity of federal law, but at least it permits re-
gional uniformity. When a circuit court of appeals approaches
the size of twenty-five judges, current wisdom suggests that it
may be time to divide the circuit. At some point, a process of
continued growth would force creation of another layer in the
appellate structure to preserve national uniformity.7
As difficult as it is to expand the federal court system, the
business of federal courts has been increasing in recent years at
a rate greater than the business of state courts." Before adding
6. U.S. CONST. art. III.
7. The papers contributed to this Symposium by Dean Carrington, see supra pp.
411-35, and Dean Griswold, see supra pp. 393-410, describe in graphic detail the reasons
for concluding that the current structure of our circuit courts of appeals cannot support
a desirable level of national uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.
8. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
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still further business, a strong justification should be demanded.
In part, the justification may rely on relinquishing some present
work in order to make room for work that can make a higher
claim to a place on the federal docket.
Is there, then, a strong justification for increasing the role
played by federal courts in resolving mass and repetitive litiga-
tion? One possible justification is easy to evaluate. To the extent
that federal law provides the rule of decision, the century-old
tradition of general federal question jurisdiction provides strong
support for access to federal court. Private actions under the
federal antitrust and securities laws provide familiar examples.
If it should be decided that the time has come to preempt the
tort law regime of the several states by a uniform system of fed-
eral law, the same arguments for federal question jurisdiction
would fall easily to hand. Brief reflection, however, suggests that
the arguments may not be so easy. Opening the doors of federal
courts to all private tort litigation within the areas that might be
preempted would drastically alter the character of those courts.
And so, some of the pending tort reform bills in Congress under-
take both to establish binding federal law on many topics and
simultaneously to exclude cases arising under this new federal
law from federal question jurisdiction.9 The prospect of creating
a regime of federal law dependent largely upon state courts for
interpretation and uniformity is not alluring. If federal courts
should not be asked to handle a large burden of routine tort liti-
gation, as seems right, the argument for federal preemption is
gravely weakened. Whether the argument is lost, however, will
depend upon both the intensity of the need to reform substan-
tive law and the alternative possibilities of using new procedures
to improve administration of present substantive law. Clearly
drafted federal statutes could effect both sweeping substantive
changes and a high degree of uniformity, even if Supreme Court
review of state court decisions provided the only opportunity for
a federal forum.
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983).
9. One example is provided by S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 208(b) (1985). Sena-
tor Kasten's substitute bill, Amendment S. 100, was equally specific. Section 4(c) of that
amendment provided that nothing in the act would create or vest jurisdiction in federal
courts "over any product liability action subject to this Act." S. 5106, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 132 CONG. REc. 56 (1986).
1987]
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Another justification for expanding the role played by fed-
eral courts is the real prospect that they may make valuable con-
tributions in administering state law. Subseqent sections of this
paper will consider a number of the various tactics that can be
used to improve disposition of mass and repetitive litigation.
Most of these techniques-quite probably all-involve increased
centralization of litigation, expanded res judicata effects, or
both. It is likely that significant advantages can be gained by
encouraging cooperative action among many courts in address-
ing related problems. There is much room for improvement in
choice of the state law to govern mass disputes. There are no
insurmountable theoretical obstacles to adoption of techniques
and institutions that will enable state courts to accomplish these
things. Reciprocal legislation, for example, could create a state-
sponsored equivalent to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation. As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to wax en-
thusiastic about the prospect that fifty states and allied jurisdic-
tions could agree to a coordinated system for shuffling cases
from one system to another for common pretrial proceedings,
much less trial and appeal. It is much more plausible to hope for
significant advances in the federal court system. In addition,
there are many who believe that the difficulties arising from fed-
eral court administration of state law are more than offset by
the neutral perspective federal judges bring to problems seen
more jealously by state judges.
If it is accepted that federal courts should play a substantial
role in exploring new techniques for resolving mass and repeti-
tive litigation, there should be no problems in satisfying the lim-
its of article III. Diversity jurisdiction can support virtually any
system that might prove desirable in handling mass litigation; if
indeed a mass case should arise in which there was no diversity
between any two parties, it is difficult to imagine any pressing
need for a federal tribunal. The concepts of ancillary and pen-
dent jurisdiction will provide useful support. It is highly unlikely
that any cogent need will arise to go further, but if necessary the
murky concept of "protective" jurisdiction might be pressed into
service. 10 Authority to regulate choice between state laws can
10. The concept of protective jurisdiction is explored in 13B WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 3, § 3565.
498 [Vol. 38
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readily be found in article III; article IV, section 1;11 and the
fourteenth amendment, section 5.12 The problems that may arise
from the Anti-Injunction Statute13 can easily be met by
amendment.
Federal courts likely will play a vitally important role in
shaping our approach to mass litigation over the coming years.
To the extent that the burden falls on state courts, they will face
essentially the same problems, exacerbated by the greater diffi-
culty of achieving coordination between separate systems. The
problems that at last are to be explored will affect all courts in
similar ways, and no easy answers will be available to any court.
IV. THE FORCES OF SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXITY
In both simple and complex litigation, essentially the same
countervailing forces push toward broad freedom of choice in
setting the claim and party contours of a suit and away from
freedom toward mandatory joinder. Mass litigation can be dis-
tinguished from simple litigation only because we feel more
acutely the pragmatic desire to avoid unending repetition of the
same issues. It is, accordingly, appropriate to illustrate the
forces that push toward party freedom by looking at a simple
setting with no more than a few potential parties and claims.
The forces that push toward mandatory joinder, on the other
hand, are best illustrated by moving from the simple setting to
settings of increasing complexity.
A. The Forces of Simplicity and Free Choice
The concerns that underlie traditional rules permitting
broad freedom of choice in determining the shape of a lawsuit
are easily described. The driver of an automobile traveling with
a close friend is involved in a collision with another automobile.
The passenger is free to sue both drivers, or only the driver of
the other automobile. Rules on party joinder do not require that
the passenger sue both; the rules of res judicata provide the par-
allel answer that the passenger has a separate claim against each
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
1987]
HeinOnline  -- 38 S. C. L. Rev. 499 1986-1987
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
driver. The passenger, likewise, need not join the driver of his
car as a plaintiff, and each injured person is said to have his own
claim. These rules expose courts and parties to the burden of
multiple litigation involving the same issues and the risk of in-
consistent results. Why, then, do we not require all parties who
are injured or who are potentially at fault to be joined in a single
action?
The rule that all parties injured in a single occurrence need
not join as plaintiffs in a single suit may be explored first. Many
arguments can be advanced in support of this rule. All of these
arguments share a common perception that litigation is not a
fully rational process, producing results unaffected by matters
that substantive rules deem irrelevant. Thus, it is said that a
plaintiff should be free to choose the time and place of suit
within the boundaries established by statutes of limitations and
rules of jurisdiction. The choice of tribunal may indeed have an
impact on the result. In part, the impact results from factors
shaped by our multiplicity of jurisdictions: one court may be
able to command more witnesses than another; one court may
apply a different substantive rule than another; the procedural
system of one court may conduce to different results than the
procedure of another; and so on. In part, the impact may result
from such matters as the identity of the judge, the area from
which the jury is drawn, the length of local docket delay, and
similar factors that surely ought not to affect the outcome even
as they do. The timing of suit may affect the result for equally
diverse reasons. It may be that one plaintiff is in desperate need
of redress, while another can afford to wait while time provides
more convincing evidence of liability or the extent of his inju-
ries. The temper of one moment may favor one party, while in
time the mood may swing to favor another. The examples can be
multiplied.
Another set of reasons for free choice arises from the impact
of party alignment on decision. One plaintiff may prefer not to
be associated in litigation with another because the other is a
particularly unsympathetic person who generates animosities
that may reduce the prospect of establishing liability. So too,
one plaintiff may prefer not to be associated in litigation with
another because the other is particularly sympathetic and gener-
ates sympathies that may skew the award of damages.
Yet another set of reasons for free choice draws from the
[Vol. :38
HeinOnline  -- 38 S. C. L. Rev. 500 1986-1987
MASS LITIGATION
countless strategic choices that must be made during the course
of any litigation. Different plaintiffs may face different risks and
even different issues. In many jurisdictions, for example, the
negligence of the injured driver may figure quite differently in
an action by the driver than in an action by the passenger. One
plaintiff may find it desirable to pursue a strategy aimed at max-
imizing the possible award, while increasing the risk of losing
entirely; another may find it better to maximize the prospect of
winning some award, while decreasing the likely size of the
award. The rules of evidence may admit damaging evidence
against one plaintiff, while nominally excluding it as to the
other.
A rule requiring joinder as plaintiffs of all who are injured
in a common transaction would also encounter a difficulty that
eases the transition to the rules that permit free choice in select-
ing defendants. The passenger could view his driver as a coplain-
tiff or as a defendant. Rules of mandatory joinder would need to
be framed as rules requiring joinder in some capacity, but not
necessarily as a coparty.
Similar reasons underlie the rules that permit free choice of
defendants. It would be unthinkable to require the passenger, as
a condition of suing the other driver, to sue also his best friend,
spouse, child, parent, or other close associates. At most, we could
require that potential defendants be sued in the first action or
be left free. Even that rule would exact a high price. A plaintiff
may perceive correctly that one potential adversary is more cul-
pable than another; if such matters should not affect the out-
come of a suit, they in fact affect both the outcome and the cost.
So, a potential defendant may be more sympathetic than the
plaintiff-the passenger may have been injured less severely
than his driver and may recover less or nothing at all if a single
tribunal is confronted with the need to compensate the driver.
The trial strategy most suitable against one defendant may vary
from that most suitable against another. Finally, a rule compel-
ling assertion or waiver of claims against all potential defendants
would prompt the litigation of many claims that otherwise
would be allowed to die. Courts quite wisely hesitate to adopt
rules that would increase the total volume of litigation.
These pedestrian, even tawdry, concerns may be supple-
mented by loftier arguments from political theory. The opportu-
nity to shape and control the assertion of an individual's claim,
1987]
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free from the cabining influence of others, may be seen as a vital
component of individual autonomy. The opportunity to influ-
ence a decision in a manner chosen by the affected individual
may seem an essential factor to the legitimate exertion of gov-
ernmental power and a symbolic means of increasing confidence
in a decisionmaking process that permits self-controlled individ-
ual participation.14 Still more exalted theories may view litiga-
tion as a public forum in which law and public policy are cre-
ated, providing a unique opportunity for participatory
democracy.15 Other less exalted theories may view individual
participation as an important means of sublimating the thirst
for less civilized means of revenge.
The concerns that support free choice in shaping litigation
in this simple setting gain added force in confronting the pros-
pect of requiring unified adjudication of many claims. One prob-
lem provides an opportunity to restate several of the observa-
tions just made. The burden of persuasion on most issues in civil
litigation requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. It
is common to translate this standard into a requirement that an
assertion be proved more probably true than false. Actual appli-
cation of the standard, however, wanders far from this simple
mark. The degree of persuasion required to overcome the inertia
of the status quo, to justify a judgment that works a change,
varies according to the nature of the issues that are left uncer-
tain and the stakes of decision. This variability is both common
and desirable. Nonetheless, it means that as the stakes of deci-
sion are augmented by increasing the number of claims and par-
ties affected, the result is likely to be affected as well. Whether
this effect is desirable seems highly uncertain.
A different feature of massive consolidation presents related
problems. As more and more claimants are joined in a single ac-
tion, it is increasingly likely that common issues of liability will
be tried ahead of individual issues such as causation and dam-
ages. Separate trial of such issues, however, may easily affect the
outcome. A tribunal unable to control the outcome of individual
14 See Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REv. 579, 593 (1984);
Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 847-49 (1984).
15. See Leubsdorf, supra note 14, at 598-99. Professor Leubsdorf drew his model of
a citizen right of access to participation in litigation that makes public policy in part
from Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
[Vol. 38
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claims may prove much less willing to compromise the issues of
liability and damages together.
Massive consolidation leads to yet a different question. In
some settings it may not really be desirable to facilitate the ad-
judication of all claims of all potential claimants. It is entirely
plausible to wonder whether some substantive rules have been,
and should be, shaped with the expectation that most potential
claimants will be too sensible to attempt to enforce their rights.
A shabby scheme that has shamelessly defrauded a million con-
sumers of a dollar each may justify a variety of official remedies,
but it is fair to ask whether we should undertake the cost of
retrieving each individual dollar for each individual consumer.
Sudden sweeping enforcement of many of the existing rules
could be untoward in many ways. 6
Finally, one more rule stands as a telling reminder of the
reasons for permitting multiple litigation. All of the frailties of
litigation noted above, and others, combine in a rule that a non-
party is not bound by the result of a lawsuit absent some special
justification, often expressed in the conclusional label of privity.
The various devices for reducing repetitive litigation of issues
that affect massive numbers of potential parties require justifi-
cation in the vocabulary of privity. How forceful these justifica-
tions may be remains to be explored.
B. The Forces of Unified Disposition
The forces that push toward unified disposition of mass
claims can be described in groups of more nearly private and
more nearly public concerns. The division is inexact, but re-
sponds to a growing tendency to separate the dispute resolution
16. Professor Hazard several years ago stated clearly the need to think carefully
about broad general enforcement of often little enforced rules:
The legislature often pitches legislation at a higher level of expectation than it
really intends to require. It anticipates a kind of discount for non-enforceabil-
ity, and thereby enjoys a pleasant moral luxury in proclaiming high expecta-
tions. But one can't indulge that luxury, or its judicial equivalent in the form
of expansive dicta, when one has to face up to enforcing the proposed rule....
The class action is thus unique, perhaps, in forcing us simultaneously to think
precisely about the terms of the substantive law's boundary lines, and to think
seriously about what is involved in actually enforcing the law.
Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D.
307, 312 (1972).
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function of litigation from broader political functions.
The most obvious value served by unified disposition is effi-
ciency. Parties are spared the burdens of repeated litigation of
the same matters, and courts are left free to provide more expe-
ditious disposition of other matters. If it is difficult to expand
the federal court system, increased efficiency may be an essential
means of enabling the federal courts to attend to all the business
that society wishes them to handle. Efficiency is far more than
mere penurious reluctance to increase expenditure on the court
system.
Unified disposition also supports consistent outcomes.
Avoiding inconsistency is valuable in part because inconsistency
is embarrassing; although lawyers grow accustomed to the fact
that litigation is an imperfect process, it may be better to reduce
the number of graphic illustrations that rub this fact into public
consciousness.
Inconsistency also raises questions of fairness. We are com-
mitted to the belief that like treatment of like cases is an impor-
tant element of public justice. Unified disposition, whether
through consolidation or preclusion, can greatly reduce the un-
fairness of inconsistency. At times, consistency may mean that a
wrong answer is consistently enforced for all claimants, but that
is a separate problem.
Unified disposition can enhance fairness in other dimen-
sions as well. When individual claims are too small to warrant
the costs of individual litigation, unified disposition can provide
enforcement of claims that otherwise would go unenforced.
When individual claims amount to more than the assets availa-
ble to respond, unified disposition may provide for an equitable
division of the assets rather than disproportionate compensation
for some and inadequate or nonexistent compensation for
others. Bankruptcy proceedings involving mass tortfeasors fur-
nish a contemporary illustration, but improved variations are
not difficult to imagine.
More accurate resolution of the merits also may be achieved
by unified disposition. In some forms of consolidation-most ob-
viously the class action-it may prove possible to devote greater
resources to a "once-for-all" adjudication than could be devoted
to adjudication of any single claim. Although it would be diffi-
cult to assume any clear relationship between the absolute level
of resources devoted to litigation and the accuracy of the result,
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it is not unreasonable to speculate that within some limits better
results can be achieved.
All of these advantages are important even if one views liti-
gation simply as the best available means, however unsatisfac-
tory, of resolving individual disputes. Under this view, courts
make law only as a necessary incident of the dispute resolution
responsibility. Another view of litigation has emerged in recent
years, strongly influenced by experience with civil rights litiga-
tion. Under this view, courts have a unique responsibility for de-
veloping public law, particularly constitutional law. If received
doctrine requires that public law be developed only within the
framework of a "case" or "controversy," the requirement should
be tailored to the advanced model of structural reform litigation
and fit to the needs of compelling public officials to behave
properly. If the federal court structure cannot be expanded suffi-
ciently to accommodate a desirable level of such public litigation
along with the resolution of private disputes, the private dis-
putes should be shunted to other fora, judicial or otherwise. In-
dividual participation by those whose interests are affected is
not so important that we should draw back from litigation in
which we cannot effectively hear all who are affected, nor even
take account of all divergent interests among those affected.
Even settlement should be resisted if there is a prospect that
adjudication will lead to new constitutional pronouncements and
different remedies. 17
This view of litigation as a tool for redressing the balance of
power between people and the dominating public and private in-
stitutions that govern their lives implies ambiguous conclusions
for mass and repetitive litigation. On one hand, it implies cen-
tral control, a single litigation in which no more than a small
group of representatives speaks on behalf of all. On the other
hand, it often implies impatience with any concept of finality. If
the first litigation does not produce the desired result, surely
some other champion should be permitted at a later day to press
the fight again.
In either model, the forces that push toward unified disposi-
tion are considerable. Their strength augments as the mass of
related claims increases and as the prospect of endless repetition
17. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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looms larger. Many devices can be used to work for unified dis-
position. The most prominent is the class action, but others
must be considered as well. Brief consideration will show that
different devices provide somewhat different balances of advan-
tage, but none provides a genuinely satisfactory substitute for
the virtues of individual and independent litigation. Sacrifices
must be made, and it is important to choose as wisely as
possible.
V. NONCLASS MEANS OF UNIFICATION
Uniform, nonrepetitive disposition of related claims can be
achieved, or at least approached, by means other than the class
action. Some of these means are so familiar as to be put aside
without further comment here. Nonmutual preclusion is a lead-
ing example of these now familiar means; if it is at times troub-
ling, it is nonetheless well established as a means of addressing
at least the simpler cases. Other means remain undeveloped and
deserve some attention.
A. Public Enforcement
Public enforcement can be relied upon to the exclusion of
any private action, and often is. Thus, it is clear in the federal
courts that a private citizen cannot compel the institution of
criminal proceedings, and recent decisions show increasing reluc-
tance to infer private remedies from statutes that expressly cre-
ate only public remedies. In a number of ways, public enforce-
ment could be adapted to the problem arising from mass injuries
that threaten repetitive litigation.
Public enforcement can be used to exclude private remedies
or to supplement them in various ways. The extent to which we
might wish to rely on private enforcement can be explored
through four examples. In the first, private price fixing has in-
flicted a one dollar injury on each of two million people. In the
second, a single person has suffered a physical injury with dam-
ages set at two million dollars. In the third, two hundred persons
have each suffered serious physical injury in a plane crash. In
the fourth, it is claimed that local police officials are engaged in
intimidation and unlawful surveillance of peaceful demonstra-
tions by local civil rights groups.
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The price fixing illustration involves widespread but very
shallow injury. It is difficult to suppose that scarce resources
should be devoted to identifying and transmitting one dollar to
each of the two million victims. This conclusion holds whether
the enterprise is undertaken by a private class action attorney or
by the government. If there is a social need for increased deter-
rence, or some belief that the injured should be given some op-
portunity for indirect compensation, it should be met by other
means. Parens patriae recovery on behalf of local governments,
or on behalf of the federal government, is an obvious alternative.
Fluid class recovery in private litigation seems less attractive in
face of doubts about the incentives that may shape the conduct
of counsel and the difficulties of generating useful ad hoc fluid
recovery remedies.
The severe personal injury illustration presents different
problems. We would be reluctant to force the victim to rely on
representation by the government. In part, this reluctance
springs from the ideals of personal autonomy noted earlier: We
believe that in matters of such personal importance, the individ-
ual claimant should have the right to control the litigation. This
reluctance, however, does not explain the failure to make public
counsel available to those who wish. Indeed, why should free
public counsel not be made available to enforce private legal
rights and to defend against the assertion of private legal rights?
Making counsel available equally to all parties would at least re-
duce the risks that arise when the government chooses sides in
the disputes of private citizens. Even then, we might worry
about the possibility that the government would allocate its ef-
forts discriminatorily, and might so augment the costs of en-
forcement as to make hollow the theoretical option to rely on
private counsel to oppose a government-supported adversary.
Perhaps the answer also reflects the simple suggestion noted ear-
lier: We do not want to encourage too many people to assert
their private rights. The more courts shift the cost of enforce-
ment to public sources, the greater the temptation may be to
institute litigation and to pursue it to the bitter end. Perhaps
the answer draws as well from more complex concerns about the
role of government as litigant in its own courts. Whatever the
reason for our present position, we may well see change in the
years ahead.
The problems presented by a single personal injury endure
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when we switch attention to the plane crash injuring two hun-
dred people. Reliance on a single public suit on behalf of all
could easily achieve a final disposition based on high quality ad-
vocacy. The sacrifices of autonomy need not be greater than in a
"private" class action. Nonetheless, we are apt to feel reluctant
to entrust matters of such great personal importance to the gov-
ernment. The question that needs to be answered is whether a
group of private class representatives, working with a group of
private counsel, provides a better means than public representa-
tion of addressing such litigation, if any means are to be used. It
does not seem likely that this question will be addressed in the
near future, and in the mass tort setting it is likely to be over-
taken before it ripens by more pervasive substantive reforms.
Nonetheless, it is not at all obvious what answer would be
reached upon careful inquiry.
However we may feel about disputes between private par-
ties, it is quite clear that we will not force reliance on public
representation in actions challenging the legality of government
action. Public assistance might nonetheless be made available to
those who wish it. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act1 establishes government standing to challenge unlawful ac-
tion by state officials. This model could easily be expanded to
reach claims of unlawful police surveillance, routine use of un-
lawful force, habitual violation of fourth amendment rights, and
similar problems that have bedeviled the concepts of standing
and class actions in recent years. Indeed, it seems likely that this
model will be expanded, albeit slowly.
Pushed beyond these examples, the notion of government
standing raises profound questions of the allocation of powers.
In re Debs 9 could be explained as substitution of a single gov-
ernment suit for the mass of repetitive suits that might be
brought by all of those injured by the train workers' strike. This
easy characterization cannot begin to address the troubling
questions raised by such cases. Even though I believe that the
principle of the Debs decision is sound, it cannot be maintained
that it provides an easy justification for widespread transforma-
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (1982).
19. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). The Debs case and allied problems of government standing
to litigate on behalf of others are explored in 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note
3, § 3531.
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tion of mass litigation into a government-sponsored, govern-
ment-controlled model.
Whatever limits are established for government litigation
and for government support of private litigation, public litiga-
tion by the government often will be followed by private litiga-
tion. Government victory may support nonmutual preclusion in
favor of subsequent private plaintiffs. Government defeat, how-
ever, presents difficult questions. Purely public remedies should
be cut off; purely private remedies should not be. In between,
difficult lines must be drawn; in drawing them, the hope should
be more to facilitate private justice than to protect courts
against the burdens of repetitive litigation.
Finally, it seems fair to note that much of the damages liti-
gation spawned by class and derivative actions can fairly be seen
as quasi-public. Enforcement is provided not by public officials,
but by attorneys who undertake to police private misconduct for
a fee reward. It is not entirely farfetched to draw an analogy to
the privateers of old, waging war at least ostensibly for the pub-
lic good. It is commonplace to wonder whether the "letters of
marque and reprisal" authorized by rules 2320 and 23.121 en-
courage more enforcement of the law against diffuse injury than
we really need. At the same time, it can be argued that the prac-
tice actually does not .provide sufficient incentive to enforce-
ment.22 These questions cannot be answered without an incredi-
bly sophisticated model of enforcement. Convincing answers
cannot be found, for example, in any model that relies upon the
assumptions that it is desirable to enforce all of our legal
prohibitions against all infractions and to expand enforcement
resources to the point at which marginal investment in enforce-
ment matches the expected marginal dollar of damages recov-
ered. We should be deeply troubled by the image of privateering
quasi-public enforcement and need to devote much thought to
it.
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
22. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
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B. Preclusion by Participation
The principle that a nonparty may be bound by a lawsuit in
which he participated is not likely to provide much help in ad-
dressing the problems of mass and repetitive litigation.
The most likely opportunity to rely on preclusion by partici-
pation arises from the activities of numerous public interest
groups that bring litigation in the names of others. Often the
group that sponsors the litigation is in complete control. In such
circumstances, it is relatively easy to conclude that the sponsor-
ing group should be precluded, as if it had been a formal party,
from raising the same questions in a second action. It is far more
difficult, however, to conclude that the group should be fore-
closed from aiding others who wish to pursue the same ques-
tions. After one prisoner has been supported by a public interest
group in an unsuccessful effort to reform prison conditions, an-
other prisoner might mount an independent challenge. To deny
the new plaintiff the opportunity for assistance by the group
seems difficult. The difficulty may seem reduced by circum-
stances in which it is clear that the group recruited the new
plaintiff for its own purposes, but administration of a test that
permits inquiry into such matters would be risky. On balance,
effective preclusion is not likely in these situations.
Preclusion is even less likely in the setting of mutual aid
and assistance between counsel for different plaintiffs in inde-
pendent mass tort suits. Cooperation in such settings may range
from the ad hoc and casual to elaborately developed coordina-
tion of discovery, expert witnesses, and other common elements
of litigation. Even the most elaborately developed efforts, how-
ever, are not likely to include a measure of control over actual
litigation strategy sufficient to support preclusion under current
tests. If new tests of control might be developed for this pur-
pose, joint control by counsel could not automatically be attrib-
uted to clients who likely had little or nothing to do with the
cooperative undertaking.
C. Duty to Participate
Even less need be said about the possibility that a nonparty
should be precluded by failure to seize an opportunity to inter-
vene in the litigation of others. Although there are occasional
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intimations that a nonparty may be bound by failure to partici-
pate, nothing has happened to shake the general rule that inter-
vention is at most a right, not a duty.
If a duty to intervene were to evolve, it would be most ap-
propriate with respect to litigation manifestly designed to estab-
lish an authoritative framework for ongoing affairs. Failure to
intervene in the lead action designed to test the legality of the
Penn-Central merger, for example, might justify the conclusion
that an independent action should be precluded.23 There is a
strong temptation to believe that when class action principles
are not adequate to the task, parents who deliberately remained
aloof from public school desegregation litigation should not be
allowed to relitigate matters resolved by the final decree. As
time goes on, some small steps may be taken in this direction.
General principles, however, may be long in coming. It is quite
safe to predict that any principles that do emerge will not reach
mass torts or similar cases.
D. Association Representation
In recent years, actions affecting the interests of many have
frequently been attacked by public interest groups that borrow
standing from their members. The rules of preclusion that might
limit repetitive litigation in this setting remain poorly devel-
oped. The intrinsic difficulties in developing satisfactory rules
suggest that not much can be done on this front.
The difficulties that arise from association standing are eas-
ily stated. A clean air association might sue to enjoin discharge
of contaminants from a cement plant, establishing injury and
standing by identifying two of its members who breathe the
plant's exhaust, and lose. Two other members of the association
might then bring suit in their own names to seek the same relief.
It is easy to argue that these new plaintiffs should be precluded
by the judgment against their association. In joining the associa-
tion, they probably knew that such litigation was one of its cen-
tral purposes; it is likely that they knew of this specific litigation
23. See Penn-Central Merger and N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968). The
question of a duty to participate in pending litigation brought by others, on pain of
subsequent preclusion, is discused in 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, §
4452.
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and possible that they may have supported it in various ways.
Nonetheless, care should be taken in addressing the preclusion
question. Genuine conflicts may exist between members and as-
sociation, but they are likely to be difficult to identify. The asso-
ciation may well have shaped its litigating strategy in light of
the positions it had taken in other actions and might wish to
take in future actions. Victory in a particular action may be less
important to the association than the principles established or
rejected. Even apart from any conflict of interests, conflicting as-
sociational priorities may mean that inadequate resources are
devoted to some association litigation.
If the members are allowed to proceed with a second action,
it is tempting to urge that at least their association should not
be allowed to lend its support. In many circumstances, this
temptation should be resisted. Denial of any right to seek help
from the association would raise serious questions that are likely
to be addressed in the language of freedom to associate and to
petition the government, however dramatic that vocabulary may
seem. If we are not prepared to deny the right to any assistance
from the association, any effort to draw lines as to permissible
levels of assistance would involve an untoward intrusion by
courts into the inner workings of one adversary camp.
In short, it is not unlikely that litigation associations will
present occasions for repetitive litigation that are not easily re-
strained. As a practical matter, however, it is not likely that this
opportunity will be seized so often as to have a severe impact on
the problem of repetitive litigation.
E. Virtual Representation
Repetitive litigation may at times be stifled by the peculiar
doctrine of virtual representation. This doctrine permits preclu-
sion of nonparties on the theory that a party to prior litigation
shared the same interests and litigated vigorously as champion
of those interests. The relatively small number of cases applying
this doctrine generally involve elements of other preclusion doc-
trines as well, including close nonlitigating relationships with a
party, some element of participation, apparent acquiescence, or
strategic maneuvering. There may be some growth in this doc-
trine, but it does not seem likely to generate any broad princi-
ples that will, for example, permit decision of the first suit by a
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victim of an airplane crash to foreclose suit by others.24
F. Nonmutual Preclusion
So much has been written about the use of nonmutual pre-
clusion that additional discussion is not required here. Nonpar-
ties frequently are allowed to take advantage of the judgment in
an earlier action if the party to be precluded has had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate. At times, this principle has permit-
ted nonmutual claim preclusion, effectively altering traditional
rules of permissive party joinder. Often such nonmutual preclu-
sion is entirely desirable. Care must be taken, however, to ensure
that adequate account is taken of the frailties of litigation. Real-
istic appraisal may suggest that differences in place, time, op-
portunities for discovery, rules of evidence, mode of trial, and
the alignment of parties may make an earlier opportunity less
than the full and fair adjudication that should be required.
Courts should not be stampeded into preclusion by an overeager
desire to avoid repetitive litigation and potentially inconsistent
results.
VI. CLASS ACTIONS
The multifarious uses of class actions cannot be described,
much less explored and evaluated, in short compass. Some of the
central issues can be explored by looking at three divergent uses.
It is important to keep in mind the differences among these uses
of class actions, lest problems generated by one use lead to inap-
propriate application of the solutions to other uses.
One use of class actions has been to provide an aggregate
remedy for widespread infliction of individual injuries that are
too minor to support individual actions for damages. This set-
ting provides virtually no benefit for a defendant confronting a
plaintiff class and has given rise to repeated fears of "legalized
blackmail," buccaneering lawyers, and overenforcement of legal
norms never calculated for thorough-going implementation. In
many ways the questions presented by this use are the easiest to
address. Few members of the plaintiff class stand to lose any-
24. The doctrine of virtual representation is discussed in 18 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 3, § 4457.
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thing of real value by the prospect of an adverse judgment. The
essential question is whether the game of complex litigation is
worth the candle of enforcing a legal norm of uncertain worth by
remedies unlikely to have any significant value to specific indi-
viduals. This question is much more substantive than proce-
dural. The procedural incidents of enforcement are less impor-
tant. If there is room for improvement in various ways, the
cumulative effect is not apt to prove weighty.
A second use of class actions might be to coerce common
disposition of individual claims that are sufficiently important to
support widespread individual litigation. Courts faced by en-
gulfing waves of litigation over common disasters have been in-
creasingly attracted to this prospect. The abstract advantages
and disadvantages of consolidation in this setting have been
sketched above. More detailed problems will be described below.
For now, it is sufficient to observe that defendants are much
more likely than plaintiffs to welcome class treatment in this
setting. Class treatment at least holds open the possibility that a
single litigated victory will effectively preclude any claims. Apart
from that perhaps chimerical hope, class treatment may provide
a much more orderly means of controlling the overall burden of
litigation, coordinating successive stages of liability and remedy
determinations, and rationalizing such matters as punitive dam-
ages. Whether or not they wish it, plaintiffs also may benefit
from class treatment in those cases involving claims beyond the
ability of the defendant to pay.
The third use of class actions to be explored here involves
declaratory or injunctive relief that forces public institutions to
adhere to the requirements of statute or constitution. The Su-
preme Court has not yet achieved a coherent concept of class
actions in this setting. The basic perplexity goes to the question
why a class action is useful at all. A single child might as well
assert an individual right to attend school in a system free from
any taint of racial discrimination as might a class of all children
in the system. If the practical meaning of a right is defined by
the remedy afforded, it would be difficult as an abstract matter
to assert that the scope of the remedy should depend on the dis-
tinction between an individual suit and a class action duly certi-
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fled under rule 23(b)(2).25 Class treatment may be important
nonetheless partly to assure representation of what may be
many conflicting views and interests and partly as a symbolic
assertion of jurisdiction over an entire problem so as to ensure
centralized control. Class treatment also may prove important
for other reasons. Elaborate definitions and redefinitions of the
rules of standing and mootness have left us in a situation that
may permit widespread injury caused by official lawlessness to
go without an acceptable champion to force adjudication. The
existence of a continuing class of victims, even if membership in
the class shifts continually, provides ample justification for adju-
dication. Explicit recognition of this fact could do much good
and need not cause harm.26 As useful as class actions may be in
this setting, however, the advantages do not come free. These
actions especially force consideration of conflicting interests and
the difficulty of defining a single class, or set of subclasses, in
face of these conflicts.
Across all three of these settings, it is important to remem-
ber that no magic inheres in the class action device. The core
problems are not touched by the label. The consequences of
cramming more and more claims and parties into a single pro-
ceeding can be shaped by the procedures chosen to administer
the proceeding, but the price remains high. Some parts of the
price deserve explicit statement.
A. Coordination of Courts and Conflict Laws
The ideal prospect held open by the class action device is
that a single court may provide a single, uniform, correct, and
binding resolution of all issues common to those affected by
common events. Disposition of individual issues would then pro-
ceed in that court or in as many additional courts as best suits
the needs of efficient administration. Structural reform litigation
may in fact approach this ideal, at least in federal courts, be-
cause it commonly involves only federal law and a workable
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
26. Recent decisions have substantially reduced the difficulties encountered when
mootness overtakes the individual claims of class representatives. Current doctrine none-
theless is unnecessarily complex. It should be sufficient to require that there be a class
with a living claim, and that the class be adequately represented. See 13A WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 3533.9.
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framework can be established to resolve such individual issues as
may arise. The multiplicity of individual issues, overlaid by
choice of law problems, makes it far more difficult to approach
this ideal in class actions that aggregate numerous small claims.
Cases arising under federal law present the best prospect for
success, and even then, administration of a system for resolving
individual damages claims is likely to prove burdensome. The
problems have seemed so severe in litigation arising from mass
torts inflicting serious injury that class treatment becomes very
difficult.
With the help of some modest statutory changes, federal
courts are in a good position to respond to the difficulties cre-
ated by multiple claimant damage actions already in the federal
system. The consolidated multidistrict procedure could be for-
mally extended to trial as well as pretrial proceedings, a result
now often accomplished by use of other transfer procedures. The
court trying the case should be free to choose the applicable law,
unconstrained either by the choice of law principles of the state
in which it sits or by the principles binding the transferor
courts. Following trial of common issues, the consolidated cases
could be retained or remanded to the transferor courts for fur-
ther proceedings.
This simple description implies the difficulties that arise
when related lawsuits are pending in different state courts. As
noted earlier, it does not seem likely that state courts will con-
trive to adopt a system that enables them to behave in the man-
ner just suggested for federal courts. Absent such a system, the
potential for confusion is great. The most likely outcome is a
congeries of class actions in many states. At best, each state
would undertake to resolve only the litigation more closely tied
to that state than any other, according to its own law, without
attempting to reach a judgment affecting the litigation in any of
the other states. Even this result is costly. Once past the thresh-
old of forcing individual claims into the class format, it seems
likely that often it would be better to have one class action than
fifty. From this point, matters get worse rather than better.
The potential for greater difficulty with state class actions is
well illustrated by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.27 Represen-
27. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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tative plaintiffs from Kansas and Oklahoma, owning interests in
gas leases in Oklahoma and Texas, brought suit in Kansas
against Phillips. They sought to represent a class of 33,000 roy-
alty owners on a claim that Phillips should pay interest on the
portion of royalty payments retained by Phillips pending admin-
istrative approval of rate increases. 28 The average claim of each
class member was $100; the total amount of suspended royalty
payments was more than $11.3 million. The royalties to leases in
Kansas were less than $3000, and the Court recognized that only
a minuscule share of the leases were on Kansas land.29 The class
finally certified by the Kansas courts was reduced to 28,100
members by excluding 3400 plaintiffs who opted out of the class
and 1500 who did not receive the mailed notice. The defendant,
Phillips, transacted business in Kansas, but was incorporated
and centered elsewhere.
Two major rulings were made in the Shutts case. The first
was that Kansas could assert personal jurisdiction over the
claims of all members of a nationwide class, even as to the vast
majority of claims having no connection whatever with Kansas. 30
Drawing from the recent view that limits on personal jurisdic-
tion draw less from restrictions on a state's sovereign power and
more from matters of individual liberty, the Court concluded
that it is enough that members of the class are provided the best
notice practicable in the circumstances, are given an opportunity
to opt out, and are provided adequate representation by the
named plaintiffs. Failure to opt out was viewed as consent to
submit to the state's jurisdiction.
The other major ruling was that it was unconstitutional to
apply Kansas law to all of the royalty obligations. 31 Without un-
dertaking to sort through the welter of circumstances involved in
the thousands of underlying transactions, the Court repeated
earlier statements that a state can apply its law only when there
are sufficient contacts with the underlying transaction to gener-
ate such state interests that application of its law is neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair.
One major question was not addressed in the Shutts case. A
28. Id. at 800-01.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 811.
31. Id. at 821-22.
1987]
HeinOnline  -- 38 S. C. L. Rev. 517 1986-1987
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW
"consent" theory may be as suitable as any other fiction to ex-
plain the conclusion that a state court should be able to enter-
tain a nationwide class action, entering a judgment that will
bind plaintiffs having no connection with the state as to transac-
tions likewise having no connection with the state. Even then,
the Court's effort to explain that any plaintiff who would wish to
pursue his own individual action is likely to be sufficiently so-
phisticated or well advised as to opt out is not fully convincing.
Be that as it may, no attention at all was paid to the prospect
that the defendant might not wish to submit to the State's juris-
diction as to matters completely unrelated to the State. The
Court's ruling that the State could not apply its own substantive
law is convincing; the same reasoning would support the further
conclusion that the State lacks jurisdiction to compel the de-
fendant to submit to its application of the law of some other
state. The problem of jurisdiction over the defendant may yet
remain to limit the availability of nationwide class actions in
state courts.
The choice of law ruling raises manifest problems for the
utility of nationwide classes in state courts. It is barely possible
that the ruling is limited by the contract and property character
of the underlying interests. It could be argued that if a common
course of tortious conduct is followed on a nationwide basis, any
state in which the conduct has caused injury has a sufficient in-
terest to justify application of its law to all of the national inci-
dents of the conduct. Barring this rather surprising turn of
events, however, the potential advantages of a class action are
greatly reduced by the need to choose and apply the unfamiliar
law of other states. In some circumstances there still may be ad-
vantages in common resolution of factual matters, although in
the Shutts case itself there did not appear to be any disputes
requiring common decision. The advantages of common resolu-
tion would be a net gain if state courts could work out proce-
dures for dispersing the individual matters among the other
state courts in the best position for proceeding further. Absent
that prospect, state courts will provide few advantages in class
actions going beyond state lines.
There is yet another difficulty with nationwide state court
class actions. Different plaintiffs and different groups of lawyers
are likely to file actions in different states, asserting overlapping
claims on behalf of overlapping classes. Sorting through the rela-
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tionships between the different actions, both before judgment in
any action and after judgments come to be entered, will prove
astonishingly difficult.
Illustrations could be multiplied. Enough has been said to
suggest that if we seek to pursue the goal of unified disposition
of related claims on a national basis, the federal courts are bet-
ter suited to the task than state courts. For the cases that aggre-
gate primarily small claims arising under state law, such as the
Shutts case, this avenue will be open only if a change is made in
the rule that the claim of each class member must exceed the
$10,000 amount in controversy threshold for diversity jurisdic-
tion. The change could easily be justified on the theory that al-
though the litigation is not intrinsically important to any indi-
vidual claimant, it is important both to the aggregate of all
plaintiffs and to the defendant. A new threshold could easily be
adopted for class actions to reflect this justification. Whatever
amount is appropriate for general diversity jurisdiction, if it is
retained, a substantially higher amount could be set for class
actions.
The advantages of relying on federal diversity jurisdiction
for resolving disputes affecting large numbers of claimants will
depend in large part upon the choice of law rules adopted. It
makes no sense for a class action in federal court to be governed
by the choice of law rules of the state in which the court sits or
by the rules followed by the courts of the various states from
which actions have been transferred to it. At a minimum, inde-
pendent federal choice of law principles should be adopted in
actions on behalf of any class extending beyond the bounds of a
single state. There is a strong temptation to go further, permit-
ting the federal court to adopt a single rule, perhaps synthesized
from several state rules, to govern all claims. In face of this
temptation, the best response may be one of yielding resistance.
The line is thin between creative federal selection of state law
and application of federal common law. In the end, we very well
may come to adoption of federal law, common or statutory, for
many of the wrongs that give rise to nationwide litigation. Fed-
eral courts, however, should go about the task slowly.
If federal courts are to undertake nationwide tort class liti-
gation, it will be necessary to adopt clear rules governing parallel
state litigation. Federal courts should have clear power to enjoin
parallel litigation, except in circumstances in which plaintiffs are
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permitted to opt out of the federal class. The federal judgment
must be binding on state courts according to federal class action
rules of preclusion. Ideally, federal courts should be given statu-
tory power to send the individual stages of the litigation not
only to other federal courts but also to state courts. All of these
things can be done easily and must be done if nationwide class
actions are pursued.
B. Class Conflicts
The problem of conflicting interests among members of a
class can be viewed from the perspective of third party standing
rules. The general rule that one person may not bring suit sim-
ply to champion the interests of another has many roots. Chief
among them are the beliefs that rights are most effectively
championed by the persons to whom they are ascribed, that
there is no need to enforce rights unless the owner cares enough
to seek enforcement, and that there are many circumstances in
which courts should honor the owner's wish that his rights not
be enforced. Class actions permit departure from this norm. The
requirement that the class representative be a member of the
class may seem to respond to all of the values underlying the
norm. On closer inspection, however, it is seen that class actions
jeopardize all of these values, and particularly create grave risks
of conflicting interests.
Conflicts of interest within a plaintiff class are commonly
illustrated by typical structural reform litigation. An example of
these conflicts is an action brought to challenge a weapons
search policy adopted by public school officials in response to
numerous stabbings and shootings on school grounds. The policy
could easily include limitations on public access to the schools
enforced by armed guards, metal detectors at all school entries,
unannounced sweep searches of all lockers, and random searches
of students. The plaintiffs could seek certification of a class of
all students in the school system. Within this class, however,
would be members of widely varying views. There are likely to
be class members who fully share the views of the civil rights
group sponsoring the litigation that every detail of the school
policy is unconstitutional. There are likely to be many members
who believe that every detail of the policy is desirable and
should be continued; they value their lives and safety more than
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abstract assertions of a right to privacy in a public place. In be-
tween, there will be many class members who hold different
combinations of views concerning different practices.
These differences of view among members of a putative
class cannot be casually ignored. Simply to assert that they are
members of a class whose claim is presented by a good represen-
tative member, aided by good lawyers, will not do. Neither will
it do to rely on the defendant to represent the class members
who disagree with the class representative, except perhaps in the
simplest of cases. Nor will it suffice to redefine the class more
narrowly; even the whimsical possibility of defining a class as
limited to those who share fully every position taken by the rep-
resentative in litigating-or much more likely negotiating a set-
tlement-is inadequate. Indeed, the problem really cannot be
avoided by moving entirely outside the class framework and as-
serting that any single person affected by the challenged prac-
tices has a right to have them eliminated as completely as the
class of all those affected. Departure from the class action for-
mat eliminates the special insult of res judicata, but it does not
further the interests of anyone to confront those who would have
been members of the class with the, actual impact of the decree
and the daunting prospect of collateral attack on the decree. It
is crucial to find some manageable means to provide representa-
tion for all of the significantly different views among those af-
fected. Only such representation will ensure full argument both
as to the nature of the right involved and, often more impor-
tantly, the shape of the decree that in one sense provides the
final detailed definition of the right. Courts undertaking to
shape social policy on the scale presented by structural reform
litigation must hear as many voices as possible.
Class action procedure may very well provide the best
means of managing structural reform litigation and hearing from
as many as possible of those affected. If that is to prove true,
however, it will be necessary to bear in mind constantly that a
class cannot be defined simply by assuming that all who are af-
fected by a common program or institution are affected alike, or
have common interests.
Mass tort class litigation has not yet become so common as
to provide as much discussion of conflicting interests. Nonethe-
less, it is clear that here too there is a vast potential for conflict
that widens as the scope of the class is widened. We may not
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have much sympathy for the interest of those who have gotten
first in line and who hope to garner a disproportionate share of
the assets available to satisfy all claims. Interests may diverge in
other directions, however, and it is difficult at times to ignore
the conflicts. The choice of the court where class litigation is
centered may be significant even within a single state and may
become vital as between several states. Similarly, choice between
different systems of law may carry different consequences for
different parties. The strategy to be used in pursuing the claim
and structuring a judgment by litigation or negotiation may
have very different implications for some claimants than others.
Most troubling, a single set of events may give rise to widely
different types of injury triggered by quite different means. The
variety of different asbestos products that have caused various
kinds of injury and risk to millions of people-perhaps all of
us-in countless ways provides sufficient illustration. The con-
cerns that support the freedom of two plaintiffs injured in a
common accident to sue separately are augmented in this setting
on an exponential scale. Yet, the values served by unified dispo-
sition may indeed be so great that they require development of
fair procedures for compromising all of these conflicting inter-
ests. If so, there is much work yet to be done.
C. Coordination of Counsel
The problems of assigning direction and control among class
counsel are substantial and are augmented by the prospect that
increased efforts at supervision by the class court may intrude
an unseemly distance into the preparations of one adversary
camp. The problems may be further augmented by conflicts of
interest among the many lawyers involved, each of whom stands
to benefit by increasing his own role in the litigation. Some sorry
stories have been told in published opinions.3 2
For present purposes, it is more important to note that the
problems of conflicting class interests exacerbate the problems
of coordinating counsel. If indeed we are to attempt to address
conflicts of interest among those affected by class litigation, we
must provide freedom for counsel to represent effectively each
32. E.g., Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Fine Paper Anti-
trust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
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major variation of interest, whether by definition of subclasses
or otherwise. The responsibility for ensuring this freedom can-
not be shuffled off onto an ad hoc law firm, lead counsel, or
other arrangement devised for coordinating the efforts of coun-
sel on behalf of the class. At least in this respect, preservation of
a system of multiple adversaries requires some judicial supervi-
sion of adversary behavior.
D. Class Preclusion
One purpose of certifying a class action is to support a judg-
ment that will command enhanced res judicata effects. The en-
hancement, however, goes primarily to the number of people
swept within the judgment. In other dimensions, a class judg-
ment may indeed have narrower res judicata effects than an in-
dividual judgment. The narrowing results from limits on the le-
gitimate reach of representation through class litigation. We
cannot fairly ask a class action to mirror the preclusion conse-
quences of individual litigation. Several examples deserve
comment.
The first area in which res judicata rules must be adjusted
for class actions is the definition of the claim or cause of action
merged or barred by the judgment. The most obvious adjust-
ment is required by the definition of the class itself and the un-
derlying purpose of the litigation. An illustration can be pro-
vided by varying the facts of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.33
A class action might be maintained on behalf of 535 owners of
royalty interests in a particular gas field, claiming that the oper-
ator had negligently started a fire that closed down production,
which wrongfully terminated their royalties. A single member of
the class who was injured by the fire while visiting the field has a
separate claim for his injuries, even though had he brought a
personal action for the royalties it might well be concluded that
he had only a single claim for all damages caused by the fire.
The same principle is illustrated by the ruling that following re-
jection of a class claim that an employer had engaged in a pat-
tern and practice of racial discrimination, individual employee
members of the class remain free to claim individual discrimina-
33. See supra p. 516-17.
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tion.34 Class suits brought for injunctive relief against prison
conditions provide numerous additional illustrations. Individual
prisoners have been allowed to maintain separate actions for
personal injuries arising from the challenged conditions, 35 and
individual claims for injunctive relief against practices having a
peculiarly individual impact also may remain open.36 If a single
court is administering a continuing structural decree, it may be
appropriate to require that the individual claims be presented to
that court, particularly if further injunctive relief is sought. This
requirement, however, is more one of class administration than
preclusion.
Issue preclusion also may be affected by the principle that
the effects of a class judgment should be limited by the purpose
of the representation. In the example of the gas field fire, a find-
ing in the class action that the operator had not been negligent
should not bind the personally injured victim in his suit for
damages. The purpose of certifying the class was to resolve all
claims relating to loss of royalties, and the character of the liti-
gation may properly have been very different from the character
of the personal injury action.
The most prominent limitation on class preclusion arises
from the requirement of adequate representation. The strongest
arguments for denying preclusion reflect the problems of con-
flicting interests and the corollary difficulty of defining a class
already noted. In the classic illustration, Hansberry v. Lee, 7 the
Court ruled that parties interested in enforcing a racially restric-
tive housing covenant were not part of the same class as, and
could not represent, persons interested in defeating enforce-
ment. In most cases, it will not be quite as easy to equate repre-
sentation with class definition, but the underlying problem will
be the same. To use a familiar example, some minority families
34. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
35. E.g., Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).
36. In Green v. McKaskle, 770 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1985), for example, the panel si-
multaneously recognized the law of the circuit to allow the plaintiff to proceed by indi-
vidual action and suggested that judicial administration would be better served by forc-
ing such claims into the framework of ongoing class litigation. In response to the
suggestion of the panel, the circuit court voted to hear the case en banc, Green v. McK-
askle, 772 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1985), and then remanded the case to the panel when the
plaintiff withdrew his equitable claims, thus rendering the en banc hearing moot. See
Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1986).
37. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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may believe that busing children many miles a day is an excel-
lent remedy for racially segregated school patterns, while others
may believe it is worse than no remedy at all. If the class is de-
fined as all minority school children and their parents, there are
persuasive reasons to attempt to resolve this difference within
the framework of the class litigation. In this setting, it may be
reasonable to blend definition of the class with the notion of a
duty to participate; the class is defined in wide terms, including
many who have divergent interests, for the purpose of forcing
assertion of their claims within a single action. This resolution
requires greater efforts to provide notice than many courts may
prefer in injunction class actions, but the burden seems more
than justified.
Apart from conflicts of interest, there may be cases in which
the class representatives simply did not provide adequate repre-
sentation. If the failure of representation is apparent during the
course of the first suit, the court should either decertify the class
or insist that additional representatives be brought in. When the
question arises in subsequent litigation, difficult choices must be
made. It would not be appropriate to rule that the representa-
tion was inadequate whenever a later court can be persuaded
that greater relief should have been won. Short of that extreme,
which could easily defeat any class action preclusion, some
workable compromise must be found that both provides assur-
ance of reasonably effective representation and avoids complete
retrial of the issues in making that determination. Despite occa-
sionally sweeping pronouncements that seem to require search-
ing evaluation of class representation, it seems likely that appro-
priate standards will in fact emerge.
Class actions also may justify distinctive approaches to the
problems of fairness that frequently plague res judicata doctrine.
For example, the prison condition examples 38 could be altered to
reflect loss of an individual action for relief, followed by a victo-
rious class decree. The notion that the earlier plaintiff should be
precluded from the benefits of the class decree is nearly un-
thinkable. Imagine, for example, turning off the hot water when
the defeated individual plaintiff appears for his prison shower! It
also may be that we cannot follow a Draconian approach to indi-
38. See supra p. 524.
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viduals who opt out of a class. If a mass tort class were defined
with opt-out privileges, for example, it may be untoward to re-
quire an opted-out plaintiff to relitigate the question of liability
after a class victory. Only the logic of denying claimants a cost-
free opportunity to opt out stands in the way, and this logic may
fail before the desire to achieve like treatment of like cases, and
at minimum cost.
The sheer number of victims also may raise fairness con-
cerns that mollify ordinary preclusion rules in the class setting.
The mass tort situation again suggests persuasive illustrations.
Certification of a class of people asserting that prolonged use of
baby powder caused or increased the risk of cancer could easily
be followed by a judgment for the defendants. Several years
later, advancing medical knowledge could provide convincing
demonstration of the once unknown causal link. Preclusion of all
members of the plaintiff class may be more than our sense of
compensation for product injuries will tolerate.
Finally, class litigation may present special needs for new
rules of preclusion within the confines of continuing litigation.
Particularly in the setting of massive litigation that endures over
many years, we may wish to ease some rules of preclusion and
tighten others. One area for easing general rules may be the very
decision whether to certify a class. Within a single action, it is
clear that certification can be undone or modified at any time,
and that an earlier denial of certification can be rethought as the
case progresses. At least some measure of this freedom should be
carried over to circumstances in which class certification is de-
nied in one action, and a similar request for certification is later
made in another action. If it can be shown that class treatment
has in fact become appropriate, principles of preclusion should
not stand in the way. 9
Structural reform litigation provides more complex illustra-
tions of the need to adapt general notions of finality to class liti-
gation. A good illustration is supplied by Local 28, Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association v. EEOC.40 The original de-
cree of the district court required the union to work toward a
39. The difficult issues that can arise in this context are illustrated by In re Dalkon
Shield Punitive Damages Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1112 (E.D. Va. 1985), discussed in 18
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4455, at 134 n.10 (Supp. 1986).
40. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
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nonwhite membership goal of twenty-nine percent.41 On appeal
the court of appeals held the goal permissible, but added a limi-
tation that the goal endure only until the union had imple-
mented valid, job-related entrance tests.42 On remand the goal
was again incorporated in a revised decree, and again affirmed
on appeal to the court of appeals.43 Certiorari was not sought
after either judgment of the court of appeals. Contempt pro-
ceeding followed contempt proceeding. In the proceeding that fi-
nally came before the Supreme Court, the district court had
held the union in civil contempt for violating various provisions
of the decree and entered an amended order that changed the
membership goal to 29.23 percent.44 Following affirmance by the
court of appeals, the arguments presented on appeal included
two seemingly related matters: That the original twenty-nine
percent goal had been derived from faulty premises, and that in
any event both statute and the Constitution bar such specific
goals when the beneficiaries have not been individually sub-
jected to the original discriminatory acts. One of these matters
was held barred from review; the other was held open.
The argument that the original twenty-nine percent goal
rested on erroneous factual premises was held not open to re-
view on a variety of grounds. One ground was that the amended
goal rested on grounds that corrected any of the alleged defects
in the original figure; since the precise percentage figure did not
affect the findings of contempt and the current decree corrected
the claimed defects, there was no occasion to consider the mat-
ter. This ground seems persuasive. The Court, however, relied
on two additional grounds. The first was that because the peti-
tioners had not sought review of either of the two original court
of appeals judgments, as the Court stated, "we do not have
before us any issue as to the correctness of the 29% figure." 45
The Court supported this conclusion by citing to a statement in
an earlier case that in proceedings to modify an unappealed
school desegregation decree, matters concerning the correctness
41. EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
42. EEOC v. Local 638 ... Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821,
830-31 (2d Cir. 1976).
43. EEOC v. Local 638, 565 F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1977).
44. 106 S. Ct. at 3028-31.
45. Id. at 3032.
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of the original decree were not before the Court.48 On its face,
this statement is- troubling. The implied lesson is that it is im-
portant at least to seek certiorari review of every court of ap-
peals decision at every intermediate stage of a continuing litiga-
tion, despite the weak prospects of success, the increased burden
on the Court's docket, and the possibility that further proceed-
ings in the lower courts will reach a conclusion satisfactory to all
parties. The second additional ground was that contempt pro-
ceedings do not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis
of the underlying order.47 This finding invokes the sound princi-
ple that the validity of a final judgment is not open to reexami-
nation even in civil contempt proceedings, as a matter of res
judicata."e
The argument that any specific race-based hiring goal is un-
lawful was held open to decision in a footnote that rejected res
judicata and law of the case arguments. The Court cited three
decisions holding that adherence by a lower court to its own ear-
lier ruling as the law of the case does not bind the Supreme
Court to the lower court ruling as the law of the case.49
At first blush, it may seem difficult to understand why the
validity of any specific goal could be challenged in face of the
principles that failure to seek review at an earlier stage takes an
issue out of the case, and that the validity of a final decree can-
not be challenged in contempt proceedings. Nonetheless, the
Court's rulings seem as correct as they may seem puzzling. The
reason for this conclusion lies in the inadequacy of traditional
46. Id. (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 432 (1976)).
47. 106 S. Ct. at 3032 n.21.
48. See 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4433, at 307.
49. 106 S. Ct. at 3034 n.24. Although this explanation is provided by the plurality
opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by three other Justices, all opinions in the case ad-
dress the lawfulness of the hiring goal on the merits. The first case cited, United States
v. A.S. Kreider Co., 313 U.S. 443, 445-46 (1941), simply undertook to resolve the merits
of an issue that had been decided by the court of appeals on a first appeal and then
adhered to by the court of appeals on a second appeal as the law of the case. There was
no discussion of res judicata or law of the case doctrine. The second case cited, Southern
Railway v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319 (1922), was one of several cases holding that adher-
ence by a state supreme court to its own earlier decision on a federal question as the law
of the case does not provide an independent and adequate state ground defeating review
by the Supreme Court. See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4007, at 557.
The third case cited, Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912), ruled squarely
that although a court of appeals may choose to adhere to its own prior ruling as the law
of the case, "[o]f course this Court, at least, is free when the case comes here." Id. at 444.
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doctrines of finality in the setting of long-enduring institutional
reform litigation. Both aspects of the Court's approach provide
good illustration.
The decision to review the validity of any specific member-
ship goal fits well within traditional doctrine. Although this very
issue had been twice decided by the court of appeals at earlier
stages of the litigation, and review had not been sought, it re-
mained relevant in at least two ways. The union was subject to a
continuing decree embodying the obligation and to civil con-
tempt orders designed to coerce compliance. It would be un-
seemly for a federal court to continue to enforce an order in-
tended to accomplish a goal prohibited either by specific
statutory provision or by the Constitution. Perhaps more impor-
tant, in one view of matters, there is no easily identifiable inter-
est in repose to set against review of the matter; the only clear
burden is the burden of continued argument. In this setting, it
makes excellent sense for the lower courts to refuse to reconsider
the matter on law of the case grounds and for the Supreme
Court to treat the issue just as it has treated other issues when a
lower appellate court has adhered to its own earlier ruling as the
law of the case. The failure to provide the Supreme Court an
earlier opportunity to consider the issue should no more bar the
parties and the Court than an earlier unsuccessful effort to se-
cure certiorari. Indeed, there is a very strong argument that
neither law of the case nor res judicata principles should bar re-
vision of the decree had the Supreme Court earlier affirmed it
and then, in another proceeding, concluded that the premise on
which it rested was invalid.
Why, then, was it proper to refuse to consider the specific
method by which the original twenty-nine percent figure had
been reached? The simplest answer, that the error was simply
irrelevant to any issue remaining in the case, is sufficient. The
Court, however, did not stop there. Instead, it said-and said
first-that failure to seek review earlier had foreclosed the issue.
It also said-and said last-that the validity of the underlying
order is not open to reconsideration in contempt proceedings.
These additional grounds seem proper and would be proper even
had certiorari been sought and denied. They are proper because
structural reform litigation requires a rolling concept of finality.
The traditional points for marking finality adopted in simpler
litigation are inadequate to the task. If such litigation is to be
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controlled at all, many early resolutions should be put beyond
reach as later stages progress.
Unfortunately, the premise that special rules of foreclosure
should be adopted for structural reform litigation is no more
than a starting point. Development of the rules will take time
and almost inevitably will result in more flexibility, indeed dis-
cretion, than we customarily associate with rules of preclusion.
The matters most readily foreclosed will be matters of adjudi-
cated fact. The possible shortcomings in the premises underlying
the choice of a twenty-nine percent membership goal, rather
than a goal of nineteen percent or thirty-nine percent, are easily
put aside so far as they relate to determination of substantially
unchanged facts. At the same time, it is essential to retain the
traditional power to adjust a continuing and prospective decree
to changed fact circumstances; a substantial change in the com-
position of the available labor pool, for example, could easily re-
quire a corresponding change in the decree.
Examples could be proliferated. In general terms, continu-
ing reexamination is likely to be most appropriate as to the
broad terms of structural remedies. No matter what the judge
says, for example, initial rejection of proposed sweeping reme-
dies should seldom foreclose reexamination of the same remedies
if the initially chosen remedies do not work. Changes in the law
should be accommodated much more readily than in other set-
tings; the very framework of rule 60(b) 50 recognizes as much.
Even within these broad categories, however, courts must be
careful in working toward new answers, recognizing that many of
the traditional values of res judicata are diluted in this setting.
VII. OTHER CONSOLIDATION DEVICES
The manifest uncertainties surrounding class actions may
suggest consideration of alternative consolidation devices. If the
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in part-
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or oth-
erwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have pro-
spective application ....
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alternatives are sufficiently modest, they may avoid the dilem-
mas that inhere in class actions. The more ambitious alterna-
tives are likely to provide less satisfactory means of resolving the
same dilemmas. The greater the proportion of all related litiga-
tion subject to consolidation, the larger the problems. Class ac-
tions provide a familiar means of addressing these problems and
focus attention on the conflicts that could be lost from sight if
the form of individual participation provided by other devices
should blind us to the reality of individual subordination to
group control. Brief discussion is sufficient to sketch the
alternatives.
The simple devices for consolidation are well known. Cases
pending before a single court can be consolidated to permit joint
proceedings at any level up to and including common trial and
appeal. Mandatory party joinder can be developed to facilitate
litigation in the court that commands the widest array of parties
affected by common questions. In the federal system, transfer
for consolidated pretrial proceedings has become familiar and
may be supplemented by an order of the pretrial court that ex-
ercises the transfer powers of the transferor courts to consolidate
all proceedings for trial. These devices can do much in simple
situations involving a few parties, and can do more in dealing
with litigation in federal courts.
More complex devices are easily imagined. Perhaps the
most devious model is that of interpleader. Courts so far have
steadfastly resisted the temptation to permit a potential defend-
ant such as a mass tortfeasor to consolidate litigation in a single
court by attempting to interplead all potential claimants. Resis-
tance has rested squarely on the reasons for permitting individ-
ual claimants to control their own litigations. The form is availa-
ble, however, to support broad expansion. Such expansion
should be resisted. The form of interpleader would imply that
each interpleaded claimant is a party, with the rights of a party
to control his individual strategy and argument. The fact inevi-
tably would be that mass litigation cannot be managed in this
way. The best that one could hope would be that courts would
painfully recreate protective and controlling devices no better
than those immediately suggested by class actions. The worst
would be pandemonium multiplied manyfold.
Interpleader at least has the obvious virtue of providing a
traditional means of forestalling or enjoining related litigation in
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other courts. Other devices for consolidation would need to re-
create these means by brute force. It is possible to imagine any
number of varying systems for gathering large numbers of re-
lated actions pending in various federal and state courts into one
common proceeding. As twice suggested earlier, the only worka-
ble systems at all likely to emerge will gather the litigation into
a common federal proceeding. The details of such systems neces-
sarily must be vexing. Initially, a choice must be made between
a system that provides abstract definitions of the circumstances
in which consolidation can be effected and a system that relies
on the discretion of some central authority to effect consolida-
tion. The path of abstract definition must involve arbitrary lines
and may never prove fully satisfactory. How many actions, grow-
ing out of what degree of common claims, must be pending in
how many courts to permit some party, whether a plaintiff or
some number of defendants, to compel consolidation? What
means are to be used: removal from state courts to local federal
courts, removal to a predesignated tribunal that then assigns a
final forum, or injunction of future litigation? What means will
be available for deconsolidation once common issues have been
resolved to the limits of prudence? How far are common choices
of law to be forced? The path of discretion involves many of the
same questions, but substitutes the problem of identifying the
tribunal that is to exercise discretion. Should local federal courts
decide the question of consolidation, either as between federal
courts or among all courts, state and federal? Should a central
tribunal be created, by analogy to the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation? If there is to be a central panel, should
state judges be included among its members? If so, how can that
be reconciled with the restrictions of article III? What system of
appellate review, if any, should be provided for the consolidation
decision?
There is little doubt that federal judicial power can be ex-
tended to some system other than a nationwide federal class ac-
tion that would permit consolidation of litigation pending in
state and federal courts. The drafting task will be difficult. Be-
yond those difficulties lie all of the -problems sketched above.
Consolidation of many individual actions cannot provide any
easy answer to the problems of conflicting interests, delegation
of sufficient control to lead counsel to avoid chaos, choice of law,
or the like. If class actions do not provide perfect devices for
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responding to these problems, at least they strip away the fic-
tions that may becloud other consolidation devices. Subordina-
tion of individual interests to common control is essential to
consolidation, and the problems are made most manifest by
class actions. If we are to pursue consolidation, class actions pro-
vide a better form than most of the likely alternatives.
VIII. EPILOGUE
The suggestion that class actions are likely to provide the
best means of consolidating litigation that affects many should
not be taken as a conclusion that consolidation is always desira-
ble. The main theme of these reflections is that we pay a very
high price for our present combination of procedural devices and
substantive laws. Perhaps the price is well paid. Yet, we must,
and surely will, continue to explore alternatives.
The most fundamental decisions to be made involve the role
we wish federal courts to play in our society in years to come.
The difficulty and contentiousness of those decisions is exceeded
only by their importance. Within the last third of a century, fed-
eral courts have led the way to vast social changes in such areas
as public school desegregation and more generalized visions of
civil rights, legislative representation, and abortion. If we wish
them to perform like functions in the future, we may need to
choose carefully among the other chores that can be assigned to
them, or indeed to any judicial tribunals. Mass litigation is an
area in which federal courts could contribute much over the in-
termediate future. Many changes will be required if the federal
courts are to serve this function and also continue to discharge
the unique duties they have assumed in recent years. The ques-
tions are easily identified, the answers are elusive, and the time
to undertake the quest is upon us.
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